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Freeman: Partisan Gerrymandering and Georgia: Red, White, and Blue or Just

PARTISAN GERRYMANDERING AND GEORGIA:
RED, WHITE, AND BLUE OR JUST RED AND
BLUE?
M. Christopher Freeman, Jr.*
INTRODUCTION
In 1811, the recently elected Massachusetts Governor Elbridge
Gerry approved a plan to redraw electoral districts in favor of the
Democratic-Republican Party over the opposing Federalist Party.1
However, the plan and the following year’s state senate election
results resulted in considerable political and public opposition.2
Although the popular vote was nearly split between the DemocraticRepublicans and the Federalists, the former won twenty-nine of the
forty available seats: nearly seventy-five percent.3 One of the new
districts created by the plan, Essex, became the center of criticism for
its highly unusual and serpentine shape, weaving back and forth
across county lines and splitting towns in two.4 Political cartoonists,
leaping at the opportunity to further deride Governor Gerry’s
redistricting plan, added talons, wings, eyes, and teeth to the Essex

*
J.D. Candidate, 2019, Georgia State University College of Law. Thank you to Professor Patrick
Wiseman for your invaluable help, criticism, and patience with me and this Note from conception to
publication. An additional thanks need also be given to all the editors of the Georgia State University
Law Review for sacrificing their time and energy to better this Note and the Georgia State University
Law Review. Finally, to my friends, family, and loved ones: thank you for your words of encouragement
and endless support.
1. Greg Miller, The Map That Polarized the Word ‘Gerrymander,’ NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC (June 28,
2017), http://news.nationalgeographic.com/2017/06/map-gerrymander-redistricting-history-newspaper/
[https://perma.cc/8FLN-UFTR].
2. See Paul V. Niemeyer, The Gerrymander: A Journalistic Catch-Word of Constitutional
Principle? The Case in Maryland, 54 MD. L. REV. 242, 251 (1995) (quoting Salem Gazette, Mar. 27,
1812) (“Opponents attacked the plan almost from its inception. Even before its passage, newspapers
described the plan as ‘cutting up counties and carving out districts.’”); Miller, supra note 1 (criticizing
the plan as “an abomination to democracy”).
3. Miller, supra note 1. The Democratic-Republican Party won because Governor Gerry, a member
of that party, needed to give Democratic-Republicans as many advantages as possible to secure his title
and safeguard his party’s majority control, which it was just barely maintaining. Id.
4. Niemeyer, supra note 2, at 251. Prior to this election, Massachusetts state senators were elected
to represent entire counties, so there was no need for district lines to zigzag between county lines. Id.
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district map.5 The resulting “pre-historic monster” resembled a
salamander and, so, was entitled “The Gerry-mander.”6 The name
stuck and became a term inseparable from the political maneuvering
that created it.7
Partisan, or political, gerrymandering today retains its nineteenthcentury roots, continuing to purposefully divide areas into districts to
give an advantage to one party.8 The pervasiveness of
gerrymandering raises issues not just in swing states like Wisconsin
but also in states dominated by a single party like Georgia.9 Despite
the long history of opposition to partisan gerrymandering in district
plans, it is not always unconstitutional or improper per se.10 The
Constitution vests in Congress the power of apportionment of state
legislative districts, but both the Constitution and Congress remain
silent with respect to mid-decade redistricting.11 People and groups
discriminatorily affected by heavily gerrymandered districts may still
challenge the constitutionality of those apportionments under the
Equal Protection Clause and the Voting Rights Act.12
5. Id. at 253; Miller, supra note 1. Elkanah Tisdale, an artist and Federalist, was the first to portray
the “protean district” with all its monstrous features. Niemeyer, supra note 2, at 253.
6. Niemeyer, supra note 2, at 251–53 (published on March 26, 1812, in the Boston Gazette); Miller,
supra note 1.
7. Niemeyer, supra note 2, at 253; Miller, supra note 1.
8. Political Gerrymandering, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 72 (5th pocket ed. 2016); Niemeyer,
supra note 2, at 249.
9. Whitford v. Gill, 218 F. Supp. 3d 837, 853, 872, 944 (W.D. Wis. 2016) (referring to citizens of
Pennsylvania, North Carolina, and other swing states who also recently filed suit over state redistricting
plans), vacated, 138 S. Ct. 1916 (2018); see also Ga. State Conference of the NAACP v. Georgia, 269 F.
Supp. 3d 1266, 1270 (N.D. Ga. 2017).
10. Brief of Bernard Grofman & Ronald Keith Gaddie as Amici Curiae in Support of Neither Party
at 5, Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916 (2018) (No. 16-1161) [hereinafter Brief of Bernard Grofman &
Ronald Keith Gaddie]; Ethan Weiss, Comment, Partisan Gerrymandering and the Elusive Standard, 53
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 693, 697 (2013) (stating that certain amounts of politicking are acceptable so
long as “legislatures adhere to traditional redistricting criteria”).
11. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3 (“Representatives and direct Taxes shall be apportioned among the
several States which may be included in this Union, according to their respective Numbers . . . .”);
League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 415 (2006); Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S.
109, 232–33 (1986).
12. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge
the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States . . . without due process of law; nor deny
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”); 52 U.S.C.S. § 10301 (LEXIS
through Pub. L. No. 115–60) (prohibiting apportionment schemes that reduce the voting strength of
minorities); see also Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 293 (2004) (establishing that “an excessive
injection of politics is unlawful”).
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In hearing partisan gerrymandering claims, the Supreme Court of
the United States has consistently struggled with several issues,
especially when it comes to applying a standard to determine when a
districting scheme is unconstitutional.13 Though many standards have
not withstood the Court’s scrutiny, the Efficiency Gap (EG) is a
measure that has overcome the failings of its predecessors.14 The EG
is a central aspect of Gill v. Whitford, the Wisconsin gerrymandering
case heard during the Supreme Court’s October 2017 Term.15 The
Court declined to exercise jurisdiction and remanded the case for
want of standing without explicitly ruling on the EG’s fitness as a
judicially manageable measure for determining a plan’s
discriminatory effect.16 Therefore, the Court left the door open for
future litigants to potentially succeed in integrating the EG as one
piece in a larger legal test for defining unconstitutional
gerrymandering.17

13. See, e.g., Davis, 478 U.S. at 132. A plurality of the Court held that a reapportionment plan’s
discriminatory effect can be shown where an electoral scheme consistently degrades the plaintiff’s
impact on the political process. Id. However, several dissenting Justices gave their own standard for
showing discriminatory effect and unconstitutionality. Id. at 165. The dissent looked to factors like
fairness, district shape, and adherence to established political subdivisions. Id. This divide continued in
later court proceedings, particularly in Vieth when the Court rejected the decision in Davis altogether.
Vieth, 541 U.S. at 287–88.
14. E.g., Vieth, 541 U.S. at 284, 287, 301; see also Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos & Eric M. McGhee,
Partisan Gerrymandering and the Efficiency Gap, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 831, 834 (2015). Justice Scalia,
writing for the plurality, rejected the plaintiff’s standard that required map drafters to act only with a
predominant intent to achieve partisan advantage because it was too ambiguous. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 284.
Justice Scalia also believed the Court should not have to create a standard itself. Id. at 305–06. He
therefore dismissed Justice Kennedy’s argument that a better claim could arise under the Fourteenth
Amendment if it was possible to show how a permissible representation burdened the plaintiff’s rights.
Id. at 306.
15. See Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916, 1924 (2018).
16. See id. at 1923. It should be noted how unusual it is for the Court, after finding plaintiffs lacked
standing, to remand a case so that plaintiffs have a second attempt at proving standing. See id. at 1933–
34. Normally, the Court will “remand the case with instructions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.” Id.
at 1941 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
17. See id. at 1941 (Kagan, J., concurring) (“Courts—and in particular this Court—will again be
called on to redress extreme partisan gerrymanders. I am hopeful we will then step up to our
responsibility to vindicate the Constitution against a contrary law.”); Eric McGhee, Symposium: The
Efficiency Gap Is a Measure, Not a Test, SCOTUSBLOG (Aug. 11, 2017, 10:39 AM),
http://www.scotusblog.com/2017/08/symposium-efficiency-gap-measure-not-test/
[https://perma.cc/9FV5-FHVU] (explaining that the EG primarily measures voting efficiency and should
be incorporated in a larger test because “a good legal test will probably end up measuring more than one
thing”).

Published by Reading Room,

3

Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 35, Iss. 2 [], Art. 7

490

GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 35:2

This opening is of particular importance to Georgia’s most recent
redistricting plan.18 Enacted in 2015, Georgia House Bill 566 shifted
many district lines and incited public unrest and claims of
unconstitutionality.19 In addition to the litigation already surrounding
it,20 the mid-decennial redistricting was quickly followed by another
plan in 2017.21 The EG may prove a useful measure in determining
whether Georgia’s successive redistricting plans impose
unconstitutional harm on the state’s voters.
This Note will discuss the viability of the EG and its ramifications
as part of a standard for evaluating the unconstitutionality of current
and potential districting plans, particularly regarding Georgia’s 2015
plan.22 Part I outlines the judicial history of partisan gerrymandering
and also provides an overview of the EG’s mechanics and the
development of Georgia’s reapportionment schemes.23 Part II then
examines the EG’s strengths and weaknesses, applies it and other
factors to Georgia’s current districting map, and analyzes the map’s
constitutionality.24 Finally, Part III proposes changes to Georgia’s
current plan that, through legislative conformity to specified
standards, will ensure adherence to constitutional principles.25

18. H.B. 566, 153rd Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2015).
19. Id. (revising the borders of seventeen districts); see also Ga. State Conference of the NAACP v.
Georgia, 269 F. Supp. 3d 1266, 1270 (N.D. Ga. 2017); Bill Torpy, Torpy at Large: Democracy Divided
Should
Not
Stand,
ATLANTA
J.-CONST.
(Aug.
23,
2017,
6:00
AM),
http://www.myajc.com/news/local/torpy-large-democracy-divided-should-notstand/KaxFVEPXsuxkBGpUe7BpeK/ [https://perma.cc/Q7BW-H675] (describing state politics in
Georgia as “electoral insanity”).
20. See generally NAACP, 269 F. Supp. 3d at 1270. Plaintiffs filed suit against Georgia and the
Secretary of State alleging, among other things, that House Bill 566 creates unconstitutional partisan
gerrymandering. Id.
21. H.B. 515, 154th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2017). Although the house passed Bill 515 just
three days after it was first introduced, the senate tabled it on March 28, 2017. Id. The Bill would have
redrawn districts whose lines had just been changed two years earlier. Id.
22. H.B. 566, 153rd Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2015).
23. See infra Part I.
24. See infra Part II.
25. See infra Part III.
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I. Background
The right to vote is one of the undeniable cornerstones of the
Constitution.26 The First Amendment restricts federal encroachment
on individuals’ freedom of association, which is also insulated from
states’ intrusion under the Fourteenth Amendment.27 Moreover, “[n]o
right is more precious in a free country than that of having a voice in
the election of those who make the laws under which, as good
citizens, they must live. Other rights, even the most basic, are illusory
if the right to vote is undermined.”28 Yet, for nearly as long as the
right to vote has existed, gerrymandering has infringed upon it.29
A. How Gerrymandering Works
One of the few aspects of partisan gerrymandering courts and legal
scholars can agree on is its definition: “[t]he practice of dividing a
geographic area into electoral districts, often of highly irregular
shape, to give one political party an unfair advantage by diluting the
opposition’s voting strength.”30 This frequently leads to
counterintuitive election results.31 For instance, as illustrated in Table
1 below, assume that a state with three electoral districts has two
26. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561–62 (1964). The Court upheld the district court’s actions in
ordering a reapportionment of both houses of the state legislature because, “[u]ndoubtedly, the right of
suffrage is a fundamental matter in a free and democratic society.” Id.
27. Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 30–31 (1968). Justice Black commented:
In the present situation[,] the state laws place burdens on two different, although
overlapping, kinds of rights—the right of individuals to associate for the
advancement of political beliefs, and the right of qualified voters, regardless of
their political persuasion, to cast their votes effectively. Both of these rights, of
course, rank among our most precious freedoms. We have repeatedly held that
freedom of association is protected by the First Amendment. And of course this
freedom protected against federal encroachment by the First Amendment is
entitled under the Fourteenth Amendment to the same protection from
infringement by the States.
Id.
28. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 560 (quoting Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 17 (1964)).
29. See Niemeyer, supra note 2, at 249 (noting that “[t]he practice of drawing district lines to
commandeer elections has existed in America since the colonial period”).
30. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 271 n.1 (2004); Political Gerrymandering, BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY (5th pocket ed. 2016).
31. See Weiss, supra note 10, at 696 (commenting on how, because of partisan gerrymandering, a
party can receive forty percent of the statewide votes yet only win thirty percent of the seats).
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hundred ten citizens who always vote for the Democratic candidate
and one hundred sixty-five citizens who always vote for the
Republican candidate.32 One would initially assume that, because
there are more Democratic voters, the Democratic Party would
control a majority of the districts. However, legislators can draw
district lines in such a way that District A has one hundred
Democratic voters and twenty-five Republican voters, District B has
fifty Democratic voters and seventy-five Republican voters, and
District C has sixty Democratic voters and sixty-five Republican
voters.33 Under this scheme, even though Democrats make up a
majority of the population, Republicans control a majority of the
legislature.34 Since district manipulation like this can be so effective,
partisan gerrymandering is a ubiquitous and often abused tool of state
legislatures.35
Table 1. Hypothetical Districting Scheme
District
A
B
C
Total

Democratic
Voters
100
50
60
210

Republican
Voters
25
75
65
165

Winning
Party
Democratic
Republican
Republican

The method of voter distribution used above is commonly referred
to as “packing and cracking.”36 The legislative majority will try to
burden the opposing party by “packing” a large number of the
32. Infra TABLE 1. This hypothetical is based on one that Weiss gave when describing how
gerrymandering works in winner-take-all elections. Weiss, supra note 10, at 696. However, unlike
Weiss’s, this example adheres to the legal requirement that each district have the same number of voters.
Id.
33. See id.
34. See id.
35. See Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra note 14, at 840. In recent years, peaking during the 2012
election cycle, reapportionment plans have shown a large disparity in party favoritism and vote-to-seat
efficiency, namely in favor of Republicans. Id. at 831. “In fact, the plans in effect today are the most
extreme gerrymanders in modern history.” Id.
36. E.g., Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 298 (2004); Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra note 14, at
851.
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opposing party’s voters into a few districts which that party will
easily win.37 The rest of the opposing party’s voters are “cracked”
and divided among many districts for them to narrowly lose.38
Although packing and cracking votes is a common indicator of
partisan gerrymandering cases,39 not every packed and cracked
redistricting plan is improper.40 Constitutional districting principles
that courts traditionally uphold include contiguity, compactness, and
conformity with geographic features.41 Though not a guarantee, a
plan that satisfies these factors will make it more likely to adhere to
the “one person, one vote” principle that safeguards individuals’
constitutional right to vote.42 However, the area between acceptable
and excessive gerrymandering, even when traditional notions are
employed, is gray and gives rise to litigation seeking a bright line.43
B. The Modern History of Gerrymandering
Courts have consistently struggled and contradicted themselves not
only in finding a means of determining if a district map
unconstitutionally infringes on a group’s voting rights but also in
determining if the issue is justiciable.44 Despite these troubles, a
37. E.g., Whitford v. Gill, 218 F. Supp. 3d 837, 854 (W.D. Wis. 2016), vacated, 138 S. Ct. 1916
(2018); Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra note 14, at 851.
38. E.g., Vieth, 541 U.S. at 343; Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra note 14, at 851.
39. See Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 116–17 (1986) (referring to the phenomenon as
“stacking” and “splitting”). In their claims, the plaintiffs in Vieth, League of United Latin Am. Citizens,
and Whitford all addressed the “packing” and “cracking” of a group of voters. League of United Latin
Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 409 (2006); Vieth, 541 U.S. at 272; Whitford, 218 F. Supp. 3d at
854.
40. Weiss, supra note 10, at 697.
41. E.g., Whitford, 218 F. Supp. 3d at 888; Weiss, supra note 10, at 697 (listing “geographical
contiguity, geographic compactness, preserving communities of interest, and nesting” among the other
districting principles).
42. Whitford, 218 F. Supp. 3d at 888 (quoting Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 647 (1993))
(“[Traditional districting principles] are constitutionally permissible, but not ‘constitutionally
required.’”). Contra Davis, 478 U.S. at 116 (finding the defendants’ explanations for why their plan did
not conform to traditional criteria—such as the adherence to the one person, one vote principle—
inadequate).
43. Whitford, 218 F. Supp. 3d at 887. The Court also said that regardless of this ambiguity, “an
intent to entrench a political party in power signals an excessive injection of politics into the
redistricting process that impinges on the representational rights of those associated with the party out of
power,” which will satisfy the intent prong of an equal protection violation. Id. Therefore, the “intent to
entrench a political party” may give some clarity to gerrymandering cases. Id.
44. E.g., Vieth, 541 U.S. at 306. The plurality found that claims of partisan gerrymandering are a
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justiciable standard eventually emerged; one that looks to the district
plan’s discriminatory intent, effect, and any justifications in defense
of that effect.45 Nevertheless, this intent-and-effect standard took
many years to develop and is an amalgam of its failed predecessors.46
Baker v. Carr marked one of the first major decisions in modern
apportionment litigation.47 The Supreme Court defied tradition and
held malapportionment violations of the Equal Protection Clause
justiciable—that is, federal courts may hear and decide such cases.48
Nearly twenty-five years later, another challenge to a districting
plan made its way to the Supreme Court.49 In Davis v. Bandemer, the
Supreme Court, with a six-Justice majority, held that partisan
gerrymandering claims specifically presented a justiciable
controversy.50 However, the Court split when determining the correct
standard to apply.51 The plurality said there is a violation when the
nonjusticiable political questions, stating that the finding of justiciability in Davis was mistaken. Id.
45. Whitford, 218 F. Supp. 3d at 884 (prohibiting “a redistricting scheme which (1) is intended to
place a severe impediment on the effectiveness of the votes of individual citizens on the basis of their
political affiliation, (2) has that effect, and (3) cannot be justified on other, legitimate legislative
grounds”).
46. League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 469 (2006) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting); Davis, 478 U.S. at 133 (“[A] finding of unconstitutionality must be supported by evidence
of continued frustration of the will of a majority of the voters or effective denial to a minority of voters
of a fair chance to influence the political process.”).
47. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 203–04 (1962) (holding an apportionment case may be reviewed on
Fourteenth Amendment grounds as long as the grounds are independent from those of political
questions); see also ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 143 (5th
ed. 2015); Niemeyer, supra note 2, at 254.
48. Baker, 369 U.S. at 228–30; CHEMERINSKY, supra note 47, at 47; see also U.S. CONST. art. III,
§ 2, cl. 1 (“The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this
Constitution . . . .”). The Supreme Court had long held that challenges to the constitutionality of
malapportioned state legislatures—often brought under the Guaranty Clause—were a political question
not suitable for judicial review. Baker, 369 U.S. at 228. However, when those claims are brought under
the Equal Protection Clause, they do not pose political questions unanswerable by the Court because,
unlike the lack of judicially manageable standards under the Guaranty Clause, “[j]udicial standards
under the Equal Protection Clause are well-developed and familiar.” Id. at 226, 228.
49. Davis, 478 U.S. at 113. Democratic voters contested Indiana’s 1981 reapportionment plan,
passed by a Republican-controlled state legislature. Id. A district court found the reapportionment plan
gave unfair advantage to Republicans and, as such, ruled in favor of the plaintiffs. Id.
50. Id. at 127; Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra note 14, at 840. Although the Court concluded that
the issue is justiciable, it reversed the district court’s finding that the plan was unconstitutional. Davis,
478 U.S. at 129–30. Though Democrats did not receive representation proportional to the statewide
vote, the Court held that this “political fairness” principle does not mean that the Constitution requires it.
Id. at 131. Additionally, a violation does not occur when a plan merely makes winning elections more
difficult. Id. at 131–32.
51. Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra note 14, at 840.
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plaintiffs prove “both intentional discrimination against an
identifiable political group and an actual discriminatory effect on that
group.”52 Justice Powell, conversely, argued for a totality-of-thecircumstances approach that would consider traditional districting
principles.53
After another long gap, the Supreme Court again confronted the
gerrymandering issue in Vieth v. Jubelirer.54 The standard the Court
attempted to construct in Davis proved so difficult to apply that using
it would have “produced the same result . . . as would have [been]
obtained if the question were nonjusticiable.”55 The lack of a
judicially discernible and manageable standard led the plurality in
Vieth to backtrack and declare all gerrymandering claims
nonjusticiable political questions,56 despite the many standards
presented to and created by the Court.57 Further, Justice Kennedy left
52. Davis, 478 U.S. at 133 (“[S]uch a finding of unconstitutionality must be supported by evidence
of continued frustration of the will of a majority of the voters or effective denial to a minority of voters
of a fair chance to influence the political process.”). Proving a redistricting plan’s discriminatory intent
and effect may evidence an Equal Protection violation because such a violation occurs when the
electoral system consistently and “substantially disadvantages certain voters in their opportunity to
influence the political process effectively.” Id. at 133.
53. Id. at 138 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Powell pointed to key
factors like the configurations of the districts, the observance of political subdivision lines, the nature of
the procedures by which the apportionment law was adopted, and the legislative history reflecting
contemporaneous legislative goals. Id.
54. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 271–72. Democrats registered to vote in Pennsylvania contended that the
districts created by legislative and executive officers served for no other reason than “for the sake of
partisan advantage.” Id. at 272–73.
55. Id. at 279; Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra note 14, at 841. This difficulty came from Davis’s
requirement of consistent degradation of voters’ rights, which ultimately caused claims presented “prior
to the first election under a plan, or even after one or two elections,” to universally fail. Stephanopoulos
& McGhee, supra note 14, at 840–41. It also stemmed from many courts’ recognition that challenges to
a plan were not sufficient if founded solely on electoral disadvantage. Id. at 841.
56. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 281 (“[N]o judicially discernible and manageable standards for adjudicating
political gerrymandering claims have emerged. Lacking them, we must conclude that political
gerrymandering claims are non-justiciable and that Davis was wrongly decided.”). Contra Davis, 478
U.S. at 127 (“[T]he political gerrymandering claim in this case is justiciable . . . .”).
57. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962) (“Prominent on the surface of any case held to
involve a political question is found a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to
a coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for
resolving it . . . .”); Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra note 14, at 841. Appellants in Vieth proposed a
standard that requires the plaintiff show predominant partisan intent, systematic packing and cracking of
a party’s voters, and a party’s inability to translate a majority of its votes into a majority of seats. Id. at
841. Justice Souter recommended a multi-factor, burden-shifting test that considered the following: (1)
whether the plaintiff belonged to a cohesive political group; (2) whether the plaintiff’s district of
residence conformed to traditional districting criteria; (3) whether specific correlations between the
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the door open for new standards that may deem partisan
gerrymandering justiciable in the future.58 This disagreement in the
Court left the law ambiguous and further compounded the challenges
presented by gerrymandering claims.59
Despite the troubles of Vieth, League of United Latin Am. Citizens
v. Perry (LULAC) gave promise to the idea of justiciable
gerrymandering cases.60 To establish their claim, the plaintiffs
employed a partisan symmetry standard that measures “partisan bias”
by “compar[ing] how both parties would fare hypothetically if they
each (in turn) had received a given percentage of the vote.’”61 Even
though the Court ultimately rejected the partisan symmetry
standard’s applicability to this case because it was too hypothetical
and not a reliable enough measure for determining a threshold on
partisan dominance, a majority of the Justices expressed belief that it
is possible to find a judicially discernable and manageable standard.62
district’s nonconformity for those criteria and his group’s population distribution exist; (4) whether there
was a hypothetical map of the plaintiff’s district where the proportion of the plaintiff’s group was higher
or lower and conformed more with traditional criteria than the actual map; and (5) whether the
defendant intentionally manipulated the district’s shape to pack or crack the plaintiff’s group. Vieth, 541
U.S. at 347–50 (Souter, J., dissenting).
58. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 306 (Kennedy, J., concurring). While agreeing with the plurality that the
plaintiffs failed to establish a claim, “[Justice Kennedy] would not foreclose all possibility of judicial
relief if some limited and precise rationale were found to correct an established violation of the
Constitution in some redistricting cases.” Id.
59. Weiss, supra note 10, at 700. Notwithstanding the plan’s discriminatory intent, the district court
dismissed the claim because the plaintiffs failed to allege a sustainable argument for the plan’s
discriminatory effect on Democratic voters. Id. at n.47.
60. League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 410 (2006) (holding that part of the
Texas redistricting plan violated the Voting Rights Act). Texas Democrats brought this suit in 2002
because a Republican-controlled government enacted a mid-decennial redistricting that gave
Republicans a supermajority. Id. at 412. The plan was very successful and caused the Texas delegation
to go from having seventeen Democrats and fifteen Republicans in the 2002 election to having only
eleven Democrats and twenty-one Republicans in the 2004 election. Id. at 412–13. Before this case
arrived at the Supreme Court, the district court dismissed it and noted that while the only purpose of the
Texas legislature’s enactment of the plan was to gain partisan advantage, a lack of a manageable
standard hindered the claim’s success. Session v. Perry, 298 F. Supp. 2d 451, 474 (E.D. Tex. 2004).
61. Brief of Amici Curiae Professors Gary King, et al., in Support of Neither Party at *5, League of
United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399 (2006) (No. 05-204), 2006 WL 53994. Plaintiffs also
proposed a “sole-intent” standard, arguing that mid-decade redistricting for openly partisan reasons
provided a reliable standard for the Court to use. Id.
62. League of United Latin Am. Citizens, 548 U.S. at 420 (stating that the Court is “wary of adopting
a constitutional standard that invalidates a map based on unfair results that would occur in a hypothetical
state of affairs”); Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra note 14, at 842–44. Several justices, particularly
Justice Stevens, advocated for a more developed and precise form of partisan symmetry. League of
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C. The Current State of Affairs
1. The Efficiency Gap
Recognizing the possibilities for developing a legal test that the
Supreme Court would accept, Nicholas Stephanopoulos, a professor
at the University of Chicago Law School, and Eric M. McGhee, a
political scientist, ventured to do just that in 2015 when they
developed the EG.63 The goal of partisan gerrymandering—winning
as many legislative seats as possible with a certain amount of votes—
is best achieved when a party’s votes are translated into seats more
efficiently than the opponent’s, usually through packing and
cracking.64 The EG focuses on this efficiency, or lack thereof, by
analyzing the number of wasted votes a single-member district
inevitably produces in every election.65 Wasted votes are any votes
that do not contribute to a victory.66 Wasted votes include any vote
for a losing candidate and votes cast for a winning candidate in
surplus of the number needed to win—fifty percent of the votes plus
one.67 The differences between each parties’ respective wasted votes
are then divided by the total number of votes cast in the election to
generate a percentage.68 Therefore, the more wasted votes a party
has, the less effectively it has translated its votes into representation,
and the more systematically disadvantaged it is compared to the other
party.69 The EG merely represents this inefficiency in a single
number.70

United Latin Am. Citizens, 548 U.S. at 468 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens proposed that (1) a
sufficiently large deviation from symmetry is a prima facie case of unconstitutionality, and (2) the
burden then shifts to defendant to prove there are legislatively justified reasons for this asymmetry. Id.
63. Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra note 14, at 831.
64. Id. at 850–51.
65. Id. at 850.
66. Id. at 851.
67. Id. Votes cast for a losing candidate stem from their voters being “cracked”; excess votes cast for
a winning candidate result from “packed” voters. Id. at 850.
68. Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra note 14, at 850.
69. Id. at 850.
70. Id.
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The EG aggregates a district’s wasted votes “into a single, tidy
number.”71 It calculates the net number of wasted votes and divides it
by the total number of votes cast.72 Stephanopoulos and McGhee
suggest applying an EG threshold of eight percent to a districting
plan, above which is indicative of “severe gerrymandering.”73
However, this threshold is merely a suggestion that the Supreme
Court has discretion to change or even eliminate altogether.74 The
Court has the option to simply “strike down plans with extremely
high efficiency gaps and to uphold plans with very low gaps” and
develop a threshold from there.75 Stephanopoulos and McGhee also
stress that it is simply a measure of a specific mechanism behind
partisan gerrymandering and not a complete legal test in and of
itself.76 Thus, determining a plan’s discriminatory effect on a certain

71. Id. at 834.
72. Id. at 851–53. Total Democratic/Republican Wasted Votes – Total Republican/Democratic
Wasted Votes = Total Wasted Votes. Id. Efficiency Gap = (Total Democratic/Republican Wasted Votes
– Total Republican/Democratic Wasted Votes)  Total Votes. Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra note
14, at 851–53. The EG can also be calculated using either party’s seat and vote margin, if known. Id.
Vote margins are the percentages of the statewide vote received, and seat margins are the seats won by
one party. Id. That calculation looks like this: Efficiency Gap = (Seat Margin – 50%) – 2 (Vote Margin
– 50%). Id. This assumes that all districts are equal in population, as constitutionally required, and that
there are only two parties competing in a given election, which is common in single-member-district
elections. Id.
73. Id. at 888–89. Stephanopoulos and McGhee calculated the EGs of state house plans over the past
fifty years and placed plans with EGs of more than eight percent in the worst twelve percent of all plans.
Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra note 14, at 888. They found that several states’ plans repeatedly
produced extremely high efficiency gaps. Id. For instance, “Alabama, Georgia, Idaho, New York, South
Carolina, and Texas did so in the 1970s; Alabama (both plans), Georgia, Idaho (both plans), and
Mississippi in the 1980s; Idaho, Illinois, Nevada, Ohio (second plan), and Wyoming in the 1990s; and
Florida, Ohio, and Vermont in the 2000s.” Id. at 889.
74. Id. at 890–91. The Supreme Court can set the threshold as high or low, or as strictly or loosely,
as it wants depending on the circumstances presented. Id. Additionally, the Supreme Court and lower
courts have discretion to simply “strike down plans with extremely high efficiency gaps and to uphold
plans with very low gaps” and develop a threshold from there if the Court’s lack of experience using the
measure causes some apprehension. Id. at 890. This is similar to what the Court did with several
reapportionment cases from 1967 to 1975 when it invalidated plans with higher population deviations of
twenty percent or more while sustaining those with lower deviations of ten percent or less.
Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra note 14, at 890–91.
75. Id. at 890.
76. Id. at 892 (“On the merits as well, [Stephanopoulos & McGhee] believe that a rule of automatic
invalidity for plans with excessive gaps would assign too high a premium to partisan fairness.”); see
also McGhee, supra note 17.
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political group’s voting rights should also give equal credence to
other traditionally important values.77
2. Whitford v. Gill
In 2011, the Wisconsin legislature swiftly drafted and enacted a
new redistricting plan, Act 43. The governor signed the Act a little
more than a month after it was first introduced.78 The subsequent
state election results show the Act at work. In the 2012 election,
Republicans received nearly three percent less of the statewide vote,
yet secured twenty-four more seats than Democrats.79 The 2014
election continued to show Republican dominance when Republicans
enjoyed a twenty-seven seat advantage while only getting four
percent more votes than their opponents.80 Consequently, Whitford,
on behalf of twelve members of Wisconsin’s Democratic Party, filed
suit against Gill, a member of the Wisconsin Elections Committee,
claiming that Act 43 constitutes unconstitutional partisan
gerrymandering.81 The plaintiffs established that the plan unfairly
reduced Democratic voters’ statewide electoral influence, that Act 43
was purposefully designed to solidify Republican control in the
77. Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra note 14, at 892 (listing principles like compactness, respect
for political subdivisions, respect for communities of interest, competitiveness, and minority
representation).
78. Whitford v. Gill, 218 F. Supp. 3d 837, 846–48, 853 (W.D. Wis. 2016), vacated, 138 S. Ct. 1916
(2018). Wisconsin’s legislative election in 2010 marked the first time in forty years where there was a
Republican majority in the assembly, a Republican majority in the senate, and a Republican Governor.
Id. at 846. In January 2011, Scott Fitzgerald, Wisconsin Senate Majority Leader, and Jeff Fitzgerald,
Speaker of the Wisconsin Assembly, created a coalition of staff members, professors, and attorneys to
start working on a reapportionment plan for the state’s legislative districts. Id. at 846–48. After several
months of development, the plan was introduced by the Committee on Senate Organization on July 11,
2011. Id. at 853. The senate and assembly passed the Act on July 19, 2011, and July 20, 2011,
respectively. Id. The Governor signed the Act on August 23, 2011. Id.
79. Whitford, 218 F. Supp. 3d at 899–901. Specifically, the Republicans garnered 48.6% of the vote,
but secured sixty seats in the assembly. Id. at 899. Comparatively, the Democrats received 51.4% of
votes, but only secured thirty-nine seats. Id. at 901.
80. Id. More precisely, Republicans acquired 52% of the vote and got sixty-three seats. Id. at 899.
That same election saw Democrats’ vote share decrease to 48% and their seat share drop to thirty-six.
Id. at 901.
81. Whitford, 218 F. Supp. 3d at 843. The Campaign Legal Center, with Whitford as the lead
plaintiff, filed this suit against Gill, the chairman of the state elections board, claiming that Act 43
violates their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights because the Act systematically dilutes Democratic
voter strength in comparison to their Republican counterparts. Id. at 855.
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legislature, and that adopting a different map would remove the
impediment on Democratic voters and redress the constitutional
violation.82 Having satisfied the standing requirements, the district
court agreed to hear the plaintiffs’ case.83
The district court stated that the First and Fourteenth Amendments
“prohibit a redistricting scheme which (1) is intended to place a
severe impediment on the effectiveness of the votes of individual
citizens on the basis of their political affiliation, (2) has that effect,
and (3) cannot be justified on other, legitimate legislative grounds.”84
By looking to the Republicans’ mapmaking process and the new
district lines, the plaintiffs met the discriminatory intent requirement
and showed that the Republicans injected an excessive amount of
politics into the redistricting process to impinge on the Democrats’
representational rights.85 In proving Act 43’s discriminatory effect,
the plaintiffs employed the EG as a key factor in their analysis.86
Using a calculation “simplified method,”87 the trial expert found a
pro-Republican EG of thirteen percent in 2012 and a pro-Republican
EG of ten percent in 2014.88 The burden then shifted to the defendant
to prove that other legislative considerations justified the Act’s

82. Id.
83. Id. at 56.
84. Id. at 884.
85. Id. at 887 n.170 (dictum) (“The intent we require, therefore, is not simply an ‘intent to act for
political purposes,’ but an intent to make the political system systematically unresponsive to a particular
segment of the voters based on their political preference (citation omitted).”). The plaintiffs produced
evidence that legislative drafters devised multiple alternative maps to determine the electoral effects of
different district lines. Whitford, 218 F. Supp. 3d at 891. Each of these maps was more favorable to
Republicans than the last and resulted in a higher number of “safe” and “leaning” Republican districts.
Id. at 891–92. The map ultimately enacted was the one that most significantly increased the number of
Republican-leaning districts, even though several alternative maps would have still yielded a Republican
majority while resulting in a less severe partisan outcome. Id. at 897.
86. Id. at 854. The plaintiffs also relied on the vote and seat share statistics derived from the 2012
and 2014 elections. Id. at 905–06. These actual election results overcame the flaws the Supreme Court
worried about when assessing the plaintiffs’ hypothetical election results under a less partisan regime in
cases like Davis and League of United Latin Am. Citizens. Id. at 903.
87. Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra note 14, at 851–53. Efficiency Gap = (Total
Democratic/Republican Wasted Votes – Total Republican/Democratic Wasted Votes)  Total Votes. Id.
88. Whitford, 218 F. Supp. 3d at 904–05. Based on historical data of single-district, simple-plurality
systems like Wisconsin, trial experts found that for every one percent increase in a party’s vote share, its
seat share will increase by two percent. Id. at 904. This ratio was then used in calculating the EGs. Id. at
905.
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effect.89 The district court ultimately rejected the defendant’s
arguments that Wisconsin’s political geography accounted for Act
43’s discriminatory effect because the impact of the state’s proRepublican geography is too minuscule to overcome the weight of
the plaintiffs’ evidence.90 Accordingly, the court rendered judgment
in favor of the plaintiffs.91
On appeal, the Supreme Court found the plaintiffs lacked standing
because their suit concerned generalized “group political interests,
not individual legal rights” to vote.92 The Court then remanded the
case to allow the plaintiffs to prove the individualized burden on their
votes.93 Justice Kagan’s concurrence explicitly details what the
majority only alludes to: The ability of plaintiffs to have standing
against a statewide gerrymander, and the EG’s ability to adequately
measure partisan asymmetry and provide evidence of
unconstitutionality that warrants statewide judicial relief.94
D. Georgia’s Perspective
The Georgia General Assembly makes up Georgia’s legislative
branch with the house’s 180 members being elected from singlemember-districts.95 Despite enacting a district plan in 2012,96 the
legislature redrew the map in 2015 under Georgia House Bill 566.97
89. Id. at 910.
90. Id. at 912, 923–24. In addition to arguing that Wisconsin’s political geography naturally packs
and cracks Democratic voters in and around urban centers, the defendant emphasized the Act’s
accordance with traditional districting criteria. Id. at 911, 919. Recognizing that “compliance with
traditional districting principles [does not] necessarily create[] a constitutional ‘safe harbor’ for state
legislatures,” the district court also rejected this argument of the defendant. Whitford, 218 F. Supp. 3d at
912.
91. Id. at 843.
92. Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916, 1933 (2018).
93. Id. at 1934.
94. Id. at 1937 (Kagan, J., concurring).
95. GA. CONST. art. III, § II, para. 1; Ga. State Conference of the NAACP v. Georgia, 269 F. Supp.
3d 1266, 1270 (N.D. Ga. 2017). Georgia’s legislative elections require a candidate receive a majority of
the vote. NAACP, 269 F. Supp. 3d at 1270. If that majority is not attained, then a runoff will be held
between the two candidates with the most votes. Id. at 1270–71.
96. NAACP, 269 F. Supp. 3d at 1271. Following the norm of implementing redistricting plans after
every census, Georgia’s 2012 plan was based on the most recent census data. Id.
97. Id.; H.B. 566, 153rd Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2015). In addition to excluding AfricanAmerican legislators, minority residents were also denied the ability to publicly comment on it, the
district court “accept[ed] the complaint’s allegation that Georgia House Bill 566 redrew district lines to
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African-American legislators were excluded from the drafting
process and were not allowed input on the issue.98 In response, a suit
was filed in the United States District Court for the Northern District
of Georgia.99 The suit focused on state districts 105 and 111 as newly
redrawn under Georgia House Bill 566 and claimed that the plan
unconstitutionally partisan gerrymanders those districts.100 Having
determined justiciability, the district court relied on the same threepronged “intent, effect, and justification” standard used in
Whitford.101 Although the plaintiffs showed discriminatory intent,
they failed to show a discriminatory effect by not proffering a
judicially manageable standard.102 However, if such effect can be
proven, Georgia House Bill 566 may indeed be an unconstitutional
partisan gerrymander.
II. Analysis
One aspect of gerrymandering the Supreme Court does agree on is
that “an excessive injection of politics” into the redistricting process
make certain districts safer for white Republican incumbents.” NAACP, 269 F. Supp. 3d at 1271.
98. NAACP, 269 F. Supp. 3d at 1271.
99. See generally id. at 1266.
100. Id. at 1270, 1273 (alleging that Georgia House Bill 566 also constitutes racial gerrymandering in
violation of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments). Plaintiffs contend that, because of Georgia
House Bill 566, they “did not have an equal opportunity to elect a candidate of their choice in 2016, and
that they will continue to be so deprived in the 2018 or 2020 elections.” Id. at 1273. Plaintiffs also
alleged that Georgia House Bill 566 intentionally removed Democratic voters from Districts 105 and
111 to make them uncompetitive and ensure a Republican victory. Id.
101. Whitford v. Gill, 218 F. Supp. 3d 837, 884, 928 (W.D. Wis. 2016), vacated, 138 S. Ct. 1916
(2018); NAACP, 269 F. Supp. 3d at 1281–82. The District Court for the Northern District of Georgia
district court looked to Davis, Vieth, and LULAC and concluded that because the Supreme Court has
upheld the justiciability of partisan gerrymandering cases in the past, this case is also justiciable under
current case law. NAACP, 269 F. Supp. 3d at 1281–82. Looking to the standard in Whitford based
around the concept of entrenchment, the district court said a redistricting scheme is unconstitutional
when it “(1) is intended to place a severe impediment on the effectiveness of the votes of individual
citizens on the basis of their political affiliation, (2) has that effect, and (3) cannot be justified on other,
legitimate grounds.” Id.
102. NAACP, 269 F. Supp. 3d at 1278–79, 1284. Under the 2012 plan, District 105’s voting
population for Caucasians and African-Americans was 48.4% and 32.4% respectively. Id. at 1271.
Under the Georgia House Bill 566 plan, that same population changed to 52.7% Caucasian and 30.4%
African-American. Id. Similarly, in 2012, District 111 was 56.1% Caucasian and 33.2% AfricanAmerican, and was 58.1% Caucasian and 31% African-American in 2014. Id. at 1272. However, instead
of engaging any sort of standard or metric, the plaintiffs only made conclusory allegations that
defendants minimized the voting strength of Democrats. Id. at 1285.
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violates the Constitution.103 From this uniform recognition, specific
elements of constitutionality have repeatedly emerged.104 At the core
of these elements is the need to show: (1) the plan’s intent to
discriminate against an identifiable group’s voting power; (2) the
plan actually has that result; and (3) that no legitimate legislative
purpose can justify that effect.105 Thus, a plan may still be
constitutional if it satisfies the Court’s other factors even though its
EG is above the threshold.106 This standard’s success heavily depends
on the effects prong—how to identify when an injection of politics is
excessive.107 That is precisely what the EG was created to do.108
A. The Efficiency Gap’s Strengths and Weaknesses
1. Addressing the Court’s Concerns
Stephanopoulos and McGhee hold the EG out not as a broad legal
test, but as a precise measure of efficiency “across a wide range of
outcomes” that corresponds to a plan’s partisan fairness.109 Any
district plan’s EG can be calculated regardless of the level of
103. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 287–88, 293 (2004) (emphasis omitted); see also Davis v.
Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 132 (1986) (“[U]nconstitutional discrimination occurs only when the electoral
system is arranged in a manner that will consistently degrade a voter’s or a group of voters’ influence on
the political process as a whole.”).
104. See Davis, 478 U.S. at 127 (agreeing with the lower courts that “in order to succeed the
Bandemer plaintiffs were required to prove both intentional discrimination against an identifiable
political group and an actual discriminatory effect on that group”); Whitford, 218 F. Supp. 3d at 871
(“[A] successful political gerrymandering claim must include a showing of both discriminatory intent
and discriminatory effect.”).
105. Whitford, 218 F. Supp. 3d at 884, 928; NAACP, 269 F. Supp. 3d at 1282; Brief of Bernard
Grofman & Ronald Keith Gaddie, supra note 10, at *8 (“The Court should adopt a test for
unconstitutional gerrymandering that requires a showing of three specific elements: partisan asymmetry,
lack of responsiveness, and causation.”).
106. Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra note 14, at 892 (“On the merits as well, we believe that a rule
of automatic invalidity for plans with excessive gaps would assign too high a premium to partisan
fairness.”).
107. Justin Levitt, Symposium: Intent Is Enough, SCOTUSBLOG (Aug. 9, 2017, 10:44 AM),
http://www.scotusblog.com/2017/08/symposium-intent-enough/ [https://perma.cc/P54T-2KDX]; see
also Vieth, 541 U.S. at 281 (“[N]o judicially discernible and manageable standards for adjudicating
political gerrymandering claims have emerged.”).
108. See McGhee, supra note 17.
109. Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra note 14, at 854; McGhee, supra note 17 (“We folded the EG
into a possible legal test: a set of rules that clearly articulates how to weigh competing interests and
principles in a wide range of situations so justice is as swift and certain as possible.”).
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electoral dominance one party enjoys.110 The EG is applicable to
districts so dominated by a single party that redistricting previously
seemed futile and, as such, can rebut arguments that gerrymandering
claims are only important in electoral systems where a plan could
affect legislative control.111 This feature is particularly advantageous
given the Republican Party’s pronounced control in Georgia.112 The
EG also addresses concerns that the Court expressed in Davis,
LULAC, and Vieth.113 For example, Justice Kennedy feared adopting
the standard in LULAC because it speculatively calculated a plan’s
partisan bias before elections were even held under the plan.114 The
EG avoids this issue by relying on actual election results as opposed
to hypothetical ones.115
On the other hand, the EG’s reliance on concrete election results
may give new plans a beneficial grace period where they are enforced
and unchallenged until one or more elections are held and enough
data is finally generated.116 Still, the potential for litigation of these
110. Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra note 14, at 855. Districts and states where one party has such
a great political advantage “have been shielded from [judicial] scrutiny” because it is thought that no
redistricting plan, no matter how much it modifies districts, would change the legislature. Id. An
example of such is Wyoming, where the Republican Party was the majority of both the state’s house and
senate every year from 1992 to 2013. Wyoming State Legislature, BALLOTPEDIA,
https://ballotpedia.org/Wyoming_State_Legislature [https://perma.cc/8NLH-24YA] (last visited Dec.
20, 2017).
111. Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra note 14, at 855. The position that the EG is inapplicable to
heavily gerrymandered districts is too restrictive, especially for states like California that require a
supermajority to pass legislature. Id.
112. See
GA.
SEC’Y
OF
STATE,
General
Election:
November
8,
2016,
http://results.enr.clarityelections.com/GA/63991/184321/en/summary.html
[https://perma.cc/MXZ3RDR2] (last updated Dec. 1, 2016 2:06 PM) [hereinafter General Election 2016] (showing that, in 2016,
only sixty-two of Georgia’s one hundred eighty house districts voted for a Democratic representative
and only four congressional representatives from Georgia are Democrats).
113. Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra note 14, at 848–49.
114. League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 420 (2006) (Kennedy, J.) (plurality
opinion) (“[W]e are wary of adopting a constitutional standard that invalidates a map based on unfair
results that would occur in a hypothetical state of affairs.”); Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra note 14,
at 856. To reiterate, partisan bias is the divergence in how many seats each party would win if each was
allotted the same percent of statewide votes. League of United Latin Am. Citizens, 548 U.S. at 420. For
instance, if, under Georgia House Bill 566, Republicans would win 55% of Georgia’s seats with only
50% of Georgia’s votes, then the Bill would have a pro-Republican bias of 5%. See Stephanopoulos &
McGhee, supra note 14, at 856.
115. Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra note 14, at 896 (“We have used only past election
outcomes—not predicted future ones—to calculate the efficiency gap.”).
116. See id. at 897 (“Even if the threat of litigation was an election cycle away, it still would be
proximate enough to produce compliance in most cases.”).
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plans may discourage legislators from enacting them in the first
place.117 Justice Kennedy was also hesitant about solely basing
unconstitutionality on asymmetrical partisanship.118 The EG, as a
metric of asymmetry, calculates only that.119 A broader legal test
should also implement other measures to account for what the EG
does not.120 This is where traditional districting principles would
weigh for or against an initial finding of a large EG.121
2. Instability
Although addressing many past concerns, the EG still faces several
limitations. For one, it suffers from long-term instability.122 Though it
is theoretically possible for a district’s EG to remain constant
throughout a plan’s life, the EG is more likely to fluctuate in
actuality.123 A district’s EG may vary due to shifts in voting
proportions based on mass voter relocation, changes in voters’
political ideologies, or voters supporting other parties for reasons
unrelated to party affiliation, like a candidate’s personal qualities.124
117. Id. Although the plans are abandoned immediately after the first election, the partisan advantage
under the plan would also be abandoned, “communities might be destabilized, competitiveness might
surge, and incumbents might be imperiled.” Id.
118. League of United Latin Am. Citizens, 548 U.S. at 420 (Kennedy, J.) (plurality opinion) (“[W]e
are wary of adopting a constitutional standard that invalidates a map based on unfair
results . . . . [A]symmetry alone is not a reliable measure of unconstitutional partisanship.”).
119. McGhee, supra note 17 (“It does not directly measure (among other things) majority party
entrenchment, competitiveness, racial or ethnic minority representation, district shapes, the durability of
any partisan advantage, or whether the redistricting authority intended to benefit either party when it
drew the maps. But a good measure does not try to bite off more than it can chew.”).
120. Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra note 14, at 898 (advocating for a two-stage analysis where
first the plan’s asymmetry is measured using the EG, and is balanced against other factors in the second
stage to see if it was necessary for the gap to exceed the relevant threshold).
121. Id. (pointing to criteria such as respect for political subdivisions, the underlying political
geography, compactness, and other oft-cited principles).
122. Brief of Amici Curiae Judicial Watch, Inc. & Allied Educ. Found. in Support of Appellants at 6–
8, Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916 (2018) (No. 16-1161) [hereinafter Brief of Amici Curiae Judicial
Watch]; Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra note 14, at 864.
123. Brief of Amici Curiae Judicial Watch, supra note 122, at 6–8; Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra
note 14, at 864 (stating that when the EG was first used it “showed that most redistricting plans are
volatile enough that their precise consequences cannot be forecast with great accuracy”). “The
mathematical tool for predicting the fair translation of votes to seats in single-member districts is the ‘S’
curve,” but the value of the formula on which the “S” curve is based is empirically determined from
estimations of real-world elections, which significantly vary. Brief of Amici Curiae Judicial Watch,
supra note 122, at 3–4.
124. Brief of Amici Curiae Judicial Watch, supra note 122, at 13 (“Deviations from proportional
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Such volatility makes it difficult to predict the impact of future
elections, and, consequently, a district’s EG in the long run.125
Moreover, the EG’s dependence on the efficiency by which votes
are translated into seats may represent “hyperproportionalism.” This
is neither a constitutional right nor a useful means of calculating
gerrymandering because not every divergence from proportionality is
the product of unconstitutional political maneuvering.126 Some maps
with large, durable EGs may consistently advantage one party.127
Still, others with smaller EGs continue to suffer from instability.128
Using sensitivity testing to determine the probability that a
particular result will remain true may resolve some stability
problems.129 Sensitivity testing would involve uniformly shifting the
vote shares of each party in one election to yield a spectrum of
possible results that show how the EG could change in future
elections and the probability that an EG will persist.130 While
sensitivity testing may reduce some volatility concerns, it will not
eliminate them, and it does not foreclose the possibility that
significant changes in voting may severely alter the plan’s EG for the
worse.131

representation, however defined, may occur for any number of reasons other than gerrymandering.”).
125. Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra note 14, at 864; Levitt, supra note 107 (noting that the
performance of a plan in previous elections does not necessitate a similar result in future elections).
126. Brief of Amici Curiae Judicial Watch, supra note 122, at 14–15; see also Davis v. Bandemer,
478 U.S. 109, 132 (1986) (“[A] group’s electoral power is not unconstitutionally diminished by the
simple fact of an apportionment scheme that makes winning elections more difficult, and a failure of
proportional representation alone does not constitute impermissible discrimination under the Equal
Protection Clause.”). Although the EG would not require strict, one-to-one proportional representation,
it “would limit deviations from whatever level of representation was required by the ‘S’ curve,” which is
essentially just another form of proportional representation. Brief of Amici Curiae Judicial Watch, supra
note 122, at 13.
127. Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra note 14, at 864–65. State house plans like Idaho’s have
proven very stable because that state’s EG has always been enormously pro-Republican. Id. at 882–84.
Since 1970, Idaho’s EG remained above ten percent, stretching to seventeen percent at its height. Id.
128. Id. at 864–65.
129. See
Statistical
Test,
WOLFRAM,
http://mathworld.wolfram.com/StatisticalTest.html
[https://perma.cc/T849-F7Z6] (last visited Dec. 20, 2017).
130. Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra note 14, at 874. Stephanopoulos and McGhee chose the scale
and direction of voting shifts based on levels of shifts that historically occurred in most prior elections.
Id. The result was shifts of 7.5% in either direction for Congress and 5.5% in either direction for state
houses. Id.
131. Brief of Amici Curiae Judicial Watch, supra note 122, at 13–15.
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3. Uncontested Districts
The EG’s biggest limitation is its sensitivity to uncontested
districts, which decreases its accuracy.132 This shortcoming is
particularly relevant here because so many Georgia districts go
uncontested.133 Again, the number of votes each party wastes is
central to the EG.134 So, when a party needs only one vote to win,
wasted votes become harder to capture.135 Determining how many
voters a plan packs and cracks through wasted votes inherently
requires distinguishing between voters’ preferences and identifying
the party for which voters vote.136
For example, in a district where there is only chicken and pork,
Smith prefers to eat chicken. A new disease, however, recently
eradicated all chickens in the district. Though Smith still prefers
chicken, he can now only eat pork because that is the only food
available; he has no choice. Like Smith, voters in uncontested
districts have no other option but to vote for the one and only
candidate running.137 A lack of choice offers voters no opportunity to
show their political preferences, making it nearly impossible to
identify how much a plan packs and cracks.138 Smith and everyone
else who favor chicken over pork would surely eat chicken if
possible, which would change the total amount of pork and chicken
eaten. The results of an uncontested race would similarly change if it
were contested.139 While the same candidate may still win and pork
may still be more popular, the number of votes for the winner and the
amount of pork eaten would in all likelihood be lower.140

132. Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra note 14, at 865–66.
133. See General Election 2016, supra note 112. One hundred forty-nine of Georgia’s 180 districts
went uncontested in the 2016 state house election. Id.
134. See Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra note 14, at 849–50.
135. See id. at 865.
136. Id. (affirming that not knowing how many people in each district vote for each party presents a
“tricky problem for any measure of gerrymandering”).
137. Id. (“[T]he notion of support hinges on freedom of choice: voters must be able, in principle, to
select more than one option.”).
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra note 14, at 865.
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An accurate and complete EG analysis cannot disregard
uncontested races or treat those races as if there was unanimous
support for the unopposed party.141 One can examine past contested
elections in the district and apply the results to the current
uncontested election to try to avoid this dilemma.142 Alternatively, a
specific vote share can be assigned to the unrepresented party.143 But
this obviously imposes imprecise and hypothetical measurements on
a standard that already suffers from similar criticism. A more
accurate technique is to gather voting data from federal elections, like
presidential races, and use those outcomes to create a mean vote
share for the party.144 Regardless of the method used, the result is still
one based on assumption, and though the EG is largely a firm and
practicable standard, this adds to its faults.
B. Analysis of Georgia House Bill 566
Enacted in 2015, House Bill 566 is Georgia’s most recent
redistricting plan that shifted many voting lines.145 Using the same
standards as Whitford v. Gill, House Bill 566 is unconstitutional if
three elements are shown: (1) the plan was intentionally enacted to
discriminate against a political group and impede its voting
effectiveness; (2) the plan has that effect; and (3) the plan’s effect is
not justified on other legitimate legislative grounds.146
1. Intent
Contrary to using the EG to show discriminatory effect, a showing
of intent is less direct and clear-cut.147 When one party creates a new
141. Id. at 867.
142. Id. at 866.
143. Id. at 866–67.
144. Id. at 867.
145. H.B. 566, 153rd Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2015) (revising the borders of seventeen
districts).
146. E.g., Whitford v. Gill, 218 F. Supp. 3d 837, 884 (W.D. Wis. 2016), vacated, 138 S. Ct. 1916
(2018).
147. See id. at 884–85. Determining when discriminatory intent is excessive is an “open question”
because “some level of partisanship is permissible, or at least inevitable, in redistricting legislation.” Id.
at 885.
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map, it is almost always intended to favor the majority party and
disfavor the other.148 Currently, it is in the controlling party’s interest
to draft schemes that will continue to favor it.149 Thus, the intent
required for this first prong usually is easily met.150
Looking at the mapmaking process will shed light on its intent.151
Though districting plans are ordinarily adopted after the census, a
Republican legislature passed House Bill 566 in the middle of the
decennial cycle.152 It was also quickly enacted, passing both the
house and the senate less than a month after being first introduced.153
The exclusion of African-American legislators from the districting
process further evidences the Bill’s discriminatory intent.154
Although political affiliation is not necessarily determinable by race,
party and race have a strong correlation in Georgia.155 Of the 119
Republican members of the state house, none are African-American,
and only one is not Caucasian.156 On the other hand, seventy-five
percent of House Democrats are African-American.157 Thus, it is not
a stretch to infer that all African-Americans barred from the drafting
process were Democrats. Although some minority residents were not
allowed public comment on the Bill,158 this race-based exclusion is
not as easily equated to a party-based one due to the lack of data
about those residents and the lack of data suggesting strong

148. See Brief for Appellants at 63, Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916 (2018) (No. 16-1161).
149. League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 474 (2006) (Stevens, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part). Justice Stevens conceded “that legislatures will always be aware of
politics and that [the Court] must tolerate some consideration of political goals in the redistricting
process.” Id.
150. See id.; Weiss, supra note 10, at 722.
151. See Whitford, 218 F. Supp. 3d at 891–92. Drafters devised multiple alternative maps to
determine the electoral effects of different district lines with each being more favorable to Republicans
than the last. Id.
152. Ga. State Conference of the NAACP v. Georgia, 269 F. Supp. 3d 1266, 1271 (N.D. Ga. 2017).
153. See H.B. 566, 153rd Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2015).
154. Compare NAACP, 269 F. Supp. 3d at 1271 (finding that “African-American legislators were
excluded from the process of drawing and negotiating”), with Whitford, 218 F. Supp. 3d at 894 (finding
discriminatory intent where drafters of Act 43 solely sought help from Republican members of the
assembly and only presented the final plan at the Republican caucus).
155. See NAACP, 269 F. Supp. 3d at 1271.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id.
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correlations between a person’s minority status and political
affiliation.
More information on the drafting process would also be useful but
not likely determinative regarding intent. For instance, the basis on
which House Bill 566’s district lines were drawn, the number of
alternative maps created, and the extent to which those alternatives
affected districts’ partisanship would all be valuable. Although a
plaintiff may allege discriminatory intent against Democratic voters,
a court would have difficulty definitively finding that intent was
based solely on this additional information.159
2. Effect
However, if a court does find sufficient evidence of discriminatory
intent, the analysis then turns to the plan’s discriminatory effect.
Georgia House Bill 566 redrew seventeen house districts across
various parts of Georgia.160 A majority of those districts have
remained uncontested in-state representative elections since 2012.161
Following the 2015 plan, however, some previously uncontested
districts were suddenly contested in the 2016 election cycle,162 and
other districts experienced sharp increases or decreases in their
voting population.163 These observations are illustrated in Table 2
159. See id. at 1283–84.
160. H.B. 566, 153rd Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2015). The Bill redrew the boundaries of state
house districts 27, 30, 53, 55, 59, 60, 73, 104, 105, 109, 110, 111, 130, 165, 166, 176, and 177. Id.
161. Compare General Election 2016, supra note 112 (districts 27, 33, 59, 104, 110, 121, 130, 165,
166, and 176 were uncontested); with General Election: November 4, 2014, GA. SEC’Y OF STATE (last
updated
Nov.
10,
2014,
6:56
PM),
http://results.enr.clarityelections.com/GA/54042/149045/en/summary.html
[https://perma.cc/XQ7XB9WM] [hereinafter General Election 2014] (districts 27, 33, 59, 60, 104, 109, 121, 130, 165, 166, 176,
and 177 were uncontested), and General Election: November 6, 2012, GA. SEC’Y OF STATE (last
updated
Nov.
21,
2012,
8:55
AM),
http://results.enr.clarityelections.com/GA/42277/113204/en/summary.html
[https://perma.cc/L2VVM64Y] [hereinafter General Election 2012] (districts 27, 30, 33, 59, 60, 73, 104, 109, 110, 121, 130,
165, and 166 were uncontested).
162. Compare General Election 2014, supra note 161 (districts 60, 109, and 177 went uncontested);
with General Election 2016, supra note 112 (districts 60, 109, and 177 became contested).
163. Compare General Election 2014, supra note 161 (showing that, approximately, district 30 had
11,000 voters, district 60 had 8,500 voters, and district 109 had 14,000 voters, and that all of those
districts were uncontested); with General Election 2016, supra note 112 (showing that district 30 had
5,302 more Democratic voters—more than half of the 9,200 voters added—district 60 had 7,000 more
Democratic voters and 1,000 more Republican voters, district 109 had 11,389 more Democratic voters
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below, which represents the voter distribution of districts affected by
the plan from 2012—when the decennial district plan was adopted—
to the first election under House Bill 566 in 2016.164 (The Republican
Party is abbreviated by an “R” and the Democratic Party by a
“D.”)165

but only 1,000 more Republican voters, and there were 10,000 more voters in district 111).
164. See infra Table 2.
165. See infra Table 2.
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Table 2. Voter Distribution in Georgia House Elections 2012–
2016
R Votes

D Votes

R Votes

D Votes

R Votes

D Votes

District

2016

2016

2014

2014

2012

2012

27

19,469

0

12,685

0

17,290

0

30

15,115

5,302

11,127

0

15,337

0

33

19,190

0

12,098

0

15,584

6,161

59

0

20,276

0

14,361

0

20,126

60

1,443

15,824

0

8,520

0

13,374

73

15,661

8,610

10,138

5,290

18,963

0

104

19,776

0

13,133

0

18,267

0

105

12,411

12,189

7,497

6,708

10,561

10,007

109

15,507

11,389

14,096

0

19,822

0

110

18,003

0

9,063

5,442

16,365

0

111

14,488

13,542

9,540

8,416

13,172

11,695

121

20,582

0

12,014

0

17,517

0

130

16,655

0

11,060

0

13,620

0

165

0

18,197

0

11,156

0

17,607

166

26,255

0

17,260

0

24,041

0

176

14,891

0

7,938

0

13,634

0

177

5,104

9,226

0

6,582

5,338

10,998

234,550

114,555

147,649

66,475

219,511

89,968

Total

Districts 105, 109, and 111 are of particular note because of their
competitiveness and, in the case of District 109, the large influx of
Democratic voters under the 2015 plan.166 In 2012, the Republican
candidate in District 105 won by 554 votes, but that same candidate
won by only 222 votes in 2016 due to an influx of Democ ratic

166. See supra Table 2 (showing 11,389 more votes for the 2016 Democratic candidate—comprising
47.35% of the total vote—than in the prior election). Districts 105, 109, and 111 are grey-shaded for
easy reference because they are important for this analysis and are frequently referenced. See supra
Table 2.
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voters under House Bill 566.167 Similar findings are evident in
District 109 where the uncontested Republican candidate won by
nearly 20,000 votes in 2012 but won by little more than 4,000 in
2016.168 Likewise, Republicans in District 111 won by 500 fewer
votes in 2016 than in 2012.169 These voting shifts give the impression
that because of the 2015 plan, Democratic voters were cracked into
districts like District 109 and packed into others.170
The first step in the EG analysis is identifying the number of votes
each party wasted.171 Due to the many uncontested races, those
districts’ vote shares must be apportioned.172 Unfortunately, it was
not possible to accurately calculate their vote shares for 2012 and
2016 because of a lack of other election data based on house
districts.173 However, in uncontested districts that were previously
contested, vote shares in prior contested races were proportionally
applied to the 2014 and 2016 elections.174 To account for districts
that have always been uncontested, a voter share of twenty-five
percent was applied to the opposing party and seventy-five percent to
the uncontested one.175 From there, each party’s wasted and net
167. See supra Table 2. In the 2012 election, there were 554 more Republican votes than Democratic
votes. See supra Table 2. In the 2016 election, Republican votes outnumbered Democratic votes by only
222. See supra Table 2.
168. See supra Table 2. In the 2012 election, Republicans won by 19,822 votes, whereas they only
won by 4,118 votes in 2016’s election. See supra Table 2.
169. See supra Table 2. In the 2012 election, the Republican candidate received 1,477 more votes
than the Democratic candidate. See supra Table 2. But in the 2016 election, Republican votes
outnumbered Democratic votes by only 531. See supra Table 2.
170. See supra Table 2. An inference that Democratic voters were packed into District 109 is easily
made from there being no Democratic voters in the 2012 or 2014 elections, but after the 2015 plan, there
were over 11,000 Democratic voters in 2016. See supra Table 2. Adding to this assumption is the fact
that the district’s total number of votes cast in the 2016 election also increased. See supra Table 2. So, it
is not just a matter of some 2014 voters voting Democrat instead of Republican. See supra Table 2.
171. Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra note 14, at 851–53.
172. Id. at 866–67.
173. See General Election 2016, supra note 112 (containing only information on the 2016 presidential
election per congressional district voter shares).
174. See infra Table 3; see also General Election 2016, supra note 112. District 110, for example,
went uncontested during the 2016 election. See infra Table 3. It was, however, contested in the 2014
election with the Republican candidate garnering 62.48% of the vote and the remaining 37.52% going to
the Democrats. See supra Table 2. Accordingly, 62.48% of the total 18,003 votes in 2016 were
apportioned to the Republican candidate, and 37.52% were distributed to the Democratic one. See infra
Table 3. This yielded Republicans 11,249 votes and Democrats 6,754 votes in the 2016 election
calculation, proportional to the contested District 110 election in 2014. See infra Table 3.
175. Eric McGhee, Measuring Partisan Bias in Single-Member District Electoral Systems, 39 LEGIS.
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wasted votes were calculated.176 Dividing the total net wasted votes
by the total votes cast results in an EG of 6.345% in the 2012
election, 9.559% in 2014, and, in 2016, 13.515% under House Bill
566.177

STUD. Q. 55, 66 n.5 (2014) (using a “default setting for uncontested races, which assigns uncontested
Republicans a vote share of 0.25 and uncontested Democrats a vote share of 0.75”); see also infra Table
3. Because it has never been contested, District 27 illustrates this default allotment. See infra Table 3.
When the 19,469 total Republican votes in District 27’s 2016 election are multiplied by seventy-five
percent, 14,602 votes are dispensed to the Republican candidate, and the remaining 4,867, or twentyfive percent, are given to the Democrats. See infra Table 3. This method’s inaccuracy becomes obvious
when the net wasted votes are calculated because it always produces one net wasted vote for the losing
party. See infra Table 3.
176. See infra Table 3; infra Table 4; infra Table 5. Again, wasted votes are those votes for a winning
candidate beyond that which is needed to secure a win and all votes for a losing candidate.
Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra note 14, at 851. For instance, the number of votes a nominee needs to
win District 105 is 12,301—half of the 24,600 total votes in that district plus one. See infra Table 3.
Thus, because the Republican candidate won with 12,411 votes, she wasted 110 votes. See infra Table
3. Conversely, the losing nominee for the Democratic Party wasted all 12,189 of her votes. See infra
Table 3. The net wasted votes in that district is then derived from the difference between each party’s
wasted votes, which 12,079 Democratic votes in District 105. See infra Table 3.
177. See supra Table 3 (47,180  (234,550 + 114,555) = .13515); supra Table 4 (20,469  (147,649 +
66,475) = .09559); supra Table 5 (19,636  (219,511 + 89,968) = .06345).
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Table 3. Wasted Votes in the 2016 Election
Apportioned

Apportioned

R Wasted

D Wasted

Net Wasted

District

R Votes

D Votes

Votes

Votes

Votes

27

14,602

4,867

4,866

4,867

1D

30

15,115

5,302

4,905

5,302

397 D

33

14,393

4,798

4,797

4,798

1D

59

5,069

15,207

5,069

5,068

1R

60

1,443

15,824

1,443

7,189

5,746 D

73

15,661

8,610

3,524

8,610

5,086 D

104

14,832

4,944

4,943

4,944

1D

105

12,411

12,189

110

12,189

12,079 D

109

15,507

11,389

2,058

11,389

9,331 D

110

11,248

6,755

2,245

6,755

4,510 D

111

14,488

13,542

472

13,542

13,070 D

121

15,437

5,146

5,145

5,146

1D

130

12,491

4,164

4,163

4,164

1D

165

4,549

13,648

4,549

4,548

1R

166

19,691

6,564

6,563

6,564

1D

176

11,168

3,723

3,722

3,723

1D

177

5,104

9,226

5,104

2,060

3,044 R

TOTAL
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Table 4. Wasted Votes in the 2014 Election
Apportioned

Apportioned

R Wasted

D Wasted

Net Wasted

District

R Votes

D Votes

Votes

Votes

Votes

27

9,514

3,171

3,170

3,171

1D

30

8,345

2,782

2,781

2,782

1D

33

8,671

3,427

2,621

3,427

806 D

59

3,590

10,771

3,590

7,180

1R

60

2,130

6,390

2,130

2,129

1R

73

10,138

5,290

2,423

5,290

2,867 D

104

9,850

3,283

3,282

3,283

1D

105

7,497

6,708

393

6,708

6,315 D

109

10,572

3,524

3,523

3,524

1D

110

9,063

5,442

1,809

5,442

3,633 D

111

9,540

8,416

561

8,416

7,855 D

121

9,011

3,004

3,003

3,004

1D

130

8,295

2,765

2,764

2,765

1D

165

2,789

8,367

2,789

2,788

1R

166

12,945

4,315

4,314

4,315

1D

176

5,954

1,985

1,984

1,985

1D

177

2,151

4,431

2,151

1,139

1,012 R

TOTAL
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Table 5. Wasted Votes in the 2012 Election
Apportioned

Apportioned

R Wasted

D Wasted

Net Wasted

District

R Votes

D Votes

Votes

Votes

Votes

27

12,968

4,323

4,323

4,322

1R

30

11,503

3,834

3,833

3,834

1D

33

15,584

6,161

4,711

6,161

1,451 D

59

5,032

15,095

5,032

5,031

1R

60

3,344

10,031

3,344

3,343

1R

73

14,222

4,741

4,740

4,741

1D

104

13,700

4,567

4,566

4,567

1D

105

10,561

10,007

276

10,007

9,731 D

109

14,867

4,956

4,955

4,956

1D

110

12,274

4,091

4,090

4,091

1D

111

13,172

11,695

738

11,695

10,958 D

121

13,138

4,379

4,378

4,379

1D

130

10,215

3,405

3,404

3,405

1D

165

4,402

13,205

4,402

4,401

1R

166

18,031

6,010

6,009

6,010

1D

176

10,226

3,409

3,408

3,409

1D

177

5,338

10,998

5,338

2,829

2,509 R

TOTAL

19,636 D

It is ultimately up to the courts and states to set thresholds beyond
which an EG is unacceptable.178 However, the EG in the 2016
election is far too high to fall within any acceptable threshold.179 This

178. Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra note 14, at 890–91.
179. See id. at 854. The EG in Georgia’s 2016 election more than doubled the eight percent threshold
suggested by Stephanopoulos and McGhee. Id.
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EG is well above the eight percent threshold suggested by
Stephanopoulos and McGhee180 as well as the seven percent
threshold argued for in Whitford v. Gill.181 An EG of this magnitude
demonstrates the discriminatory effect House Bill 566 has on
Democratic voters by redrawing district lines to decrease their vote’s
impact and the efficiency with which their votes translate into
seats.182 In 2016, for example, Democrats received 44% of the vote in
districts affected by House Bill 566, yet they won less than 25% of
those seats.183
3. Justification
After showing discriminatory intent and effect, the burden shifts to
the defendant to prove the effect is justified by legitimate legislative
ends.184 Looking at traditional principles, almost all the districts that
House Bill 566 manipulated more or less maintain a normal shape.185
The exception is District 111, curving from Stockbridge down to the
east and dipping in and out of different cities and neighborhoods—
coincidentally resembling a salamander.186 However, even with this
one questionable district, the plan was enacted largely along party
lines, it generally preserved communities of interest, and it mostly
respected political subdivisions.187
Another possible defense of the plan is Georgia’s natural political
geography. The state has never been one for political moderation.188
180. Id.
181. Whitford v. Gill, 218 F. Supp. 3d 837, 861 (W.D. Wis. 2016), vacated, 138 S. Ct. 1916 (2018).
182. See supra TABLE 3 (showing that although Democrats made up a little less than half the voting
population, they secured less than a quarter of the total available seats).
183. See supra TABLE 2.
184. See, e.g., Whitford, 218 F. Supp. 3d at 884.
185. LEGIS. & CONG. REAPPORTIONMENT OFF., GA. HOUSE DISTRICT MAP (2015),
http://www.legis.ga.gov/Joint/reapportionment/Documents/2015/House15-PACKET.pdf
[https://perma.cc/97FV-5CJF].
186. See Overview of State House District 111, Georgia, STATISTICALATLAS.COM,
https://statisticalatlas.com/state-lower-legislative-district/Georgia/State-House-District-111/Overview
[https://perma.cc/N4V5-C8JC] (last visited Nov. 6, 2018) [hereinafter District 111].
187. See GA. HOUSE DISTRICT MAP, supra note 185.
188. See Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra note 14, at 879–84 (showing that both Georgia’s
congressional and state house plans largely favored Democrats in the late twentieth century and
currently favor Republicans).
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Georgia currently boasts strong Republican support from everywhere
but a few metropolitan areas, namely around metro Atlanta.189 An
easy contention is that Georgia naturally favors Republicans more
than Democrats, no matter how districts are arranged.190 However, as
the plaintiffs argued in Whitford v. Gill,191 a plausible counter is that
even if Georgia is naturally pro-Republican, there is no evidence
strong enough to account for the plan’s large EG. The success of this
counterargument hinges on other evidence supporting the plan’s
discriminatory intent and effect: evidence that is currently
unavailable.
It is also important to remember that adherence to traditional
districting criteria does not necessarily ensure a plan’s
constitutionality.192 Further proof, such as evidence that this plan has
the least partisan bias of other considered plans or evidence that the
plan is necessary to account for large population shifts among the
affected districts, is required to justify the Bill’s effects.
Based on this analysis, Georgia House Bill 566’s redistricting plan
meets all required elements of the standard and violates Georgia
Democratic voters’ rights afforded under the Constitution. It is,
therefore, necessary to find a solution to this problem.
III. Proposal
The solution to Georgia’s excessively gerrymandered districts is
simple enough in theory: the state legislature needs to adopt a new
plan that is less skewed toward one party.193 This plan does not need
189. See 2016 Georgia Presidential Election Results, POLITICO, http://www.politico.com/2016election/results/map/president/georgia/ [https://perma.cc/Y94V-SLU2] (last visited Nov. 6, 2018).
190. See Ga. State Conference of the NAACP v. Georgia, 269 F. Supp. 3d 1266, 1282 (N.D. Ga.
2017); see also Whitford v. Gill, 218 F. Supp. 3d 837, 912 (W.D. Wis. 2016), vacated, 138 S. Ct. 1916
(2018) (“The defendants’ primary argument is that Wisconsin’s political geography naturally favors
Republicans because Democratic voters reside in more geographically concentrated areas, particularly in
urban centers like Milwaukee and Madison.”).
191. Whitford, 218 F. Supp. 3d at 884, 912.
192. Id. at 888, 912 (recognizing that “compliance with traditional districting principles [does not]
necessarily create[] a constitutional ‘safe harbor’ for state legislatures”).
193. See id. at 911–12 (arguing that alternative maps created by legislature will “achieve[] the
legislature’s valid districting goals while generating a substantially smaller partisan advantage” than Act
43).
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to overcompensate by giving the Democratic Party an unequal
political advantage, nor does it need to result in complete partisan
fairness. In fact, it ought not do either because, as discussed
earlier,194 a one-to-one voting ratio is not constitutionally required
and would be hard, if not impossible, to achieve.195 Instead, the
controlling party can still experience some advantage over the other
party, but the state legislature should minimize this advantage as
much as possible to reduce the ineffectiveness of the minority party’s
voting power.196 Though simple in theory, the solution’s
implementation, without judicial intervention, may prove more
challenging.197
A. The Trouble with Judicial Remedies
The current solution to a plan that infringes on citizens’ voting
rights is to resolve it in court.198 This is a viable option of last resort,
and it has never succeeded and cannot do so without both parties
expending substantial time and effort in litigation.199 Nevertheless, if
a discriminated party does make a successful claim against an
ultimately unconstitutional Georgia plan, the appropriate remedy is
for the court to enter an injunction barring the use of the plan in
future elections.200 The burden of creating a remedial districting plan,
however, will still rest on Georgia’s legislature, and the legislature
must have a reasonable opportunity to adopt a constitutional plan.201
194. See supra Part I.
195. See Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 131 (1986) (finding that statewide votes in proportion to
statewide representation is not required by the Constitution).
196. Whitford, 218 F. Supp. 3d at 911–12.
197. See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 306 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy
agreed that “[a] decision ordering the correction of all election district lines drawn for partisan reasons
would commit federal and state courts to unprecedented intervention in the American political process.”
Id.
198. See Whitford v. Gill, No. 15-cv-421-bbc, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11380, at *2 (W.D. Wis. Jan.
27, 2017).
199. E.g., Ga. State Conference of the NAACP v. Georgia, 269 F. Supp. 3d 1266, 1283 (N.D. Ga.
2017) (“The Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on partisan gerrymandering teaches us that the Court could
rule in a variety of different ways on [gerrymandering] issues . . . including not ruling on them at all.”).
200. Whitford, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11380, at *2 (“The parties agree that the appropriate remedy in
this case is to enter an injunction prohibiting the use of Act 43’s districting plan in future elections.”).
201. Id. at *2–3.
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The courts are not an effective enough body to devise a state district
plan, not only because of constitutional fears of breaching separation
of powers principles but also because the state is a better institution
for “reconcil[ing] traditional state policies within the constitutionally
mandated framework of substantial population equality.”202 No entity
other than Georgia’s legislature knows better the unique
characteristics and underpinnings of Georgia’s population.203 Thus,
the legislature also knows how best to cater to those qualities while
conforming to constitutional voting standards.
Unlike plans enacted by the state legislature on its own accord,
instances where courts force a plan on the state risk excessive judicial
intervention that disrupts the state’s legislative process.204 Opponents
of the EG warn that if the judiciary is left responsible for correcting
all unconstitutional districting plans, the standard will open courts to
a tremendous volume of gerrymandering claims, clogging up courts
with meritless suits and making the judicial system ineffective.205
However, these fears are misplaced. Upholding the Constitution
and enforcing violations of it cannot be weighed against the
inconvenience of doing so.206 Although the states have power over
their own interests, this power does not insulate them when used to
“circumvent[] a federally protected right.”207 The emergence of a
manageable standard like the one in Whitford v. Gill also reduces the
complexity of litigating and deciding gerrymandering cases,
imposing less burdens on courts than past gerrymandering cases.208
202. Id. at *4 (quoting Gorin v. Karpan, 755 F. Supp. 1430, 1445–46 (D. Wyo. 1991)) (“This very
basic principle is grounded not only on the constitutional limitations of federal authority but also on the
practical reality that it is the state legislature, not the federal court, that is ‘the best institution “to
identify and then reconcile traditional state policies within the constitutionally mandated framework of
substantial population equality.”‘”).
203. Id.
204. Brief for Appellants, supra note 148, at 2 (“Whenever a politically minded body draws electoral
boundaries . . . any displeased voter in the State (even one living in a district not altered by the new
map) can file a lawsuit in federal court seeking invalidation of the entire map.”).
205. Id. at 2. Under the EG, “one out of every three legislative maps over the last [forty-five] years
would have had too much partisan effect.” Id. at 3 (emphasis omitted).
206. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 566 (1964).
207. Id.
208. G. Michael Parsons, The Institutional Case for Partisan Gerrymandering Claims, 2017
CARDOZO L. REV. DE NOVO 155, 157 (2017).

Published by Reading Room,

35

Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 35, Iss. 2 [], Art. 7

522

GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 35:2

Furthermore, though state legislators may instinctively want to nudge
district lines one way or the other to better serve their own party, not
every instance of this will result in court action.
In addition to certain levels of partisanship being common and
almost unavoidable in districting maps, potential plaintiffs will find it
hard to establish the legislators’ discriminatory intent if the map only
makes minor changes to district lines.209 Similarly, proving such a
plan’s discriminatory effect will be equally challenging because it is
likely too minute to account for any substantial diminishment in
voting power.210 It is important to reiterate that it should not be the
courts’ primary responsibility to determine when a plan is
unconstitutional. While established redistricting standards make
judicial intervention easier, it is the state’s responsibility to
implement a plan that does not require judicial oversight.
B. A Legislative Solution
With the clear limits imposed on partisan gerrymandering by the
intent-and-effect standard, the first line of defense in protecting
constitutional voting rights rests with individual state legislatures.211
The power to enact redistricting plans undisputedly belongs to the
states, and, in light of the current legal tests for determining
unconstitutionally gerrymandered districts, it is the states’
prerogative to pass plans that will result in the least amount of
political and judicial resistance.212 Therefore, enacting district maps
that are constitutional to begin with will avoid future costs of
litigation and public backlash resulting from constitutional issues.213
In Georgia’s situation, a legislative solution would call for the
immediate passage of a new district map that will correct the lines
drawn by House Bill 566. Though difficult, it is possible for a new
209. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 332 (2004) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[P]olitical considerations
may properly influence the decisions of our elected officials.”); Parsons, supra note 208, at 176.
210. Parsons, supra note 208, at 176.
211. Whitford v. Gill, 218 F. Supp. 3d 837, 884, 928 (W.D. Wis. 2016), vacated, 138 S. Ct. 1916
(2018)
212. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3; see Whitford, 218 F. Supp. 3d at 883–84.
213. See Weiss, supra note 10, at 696.
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plan to have a statewide view and ensure all 180 of Georgia’s house
districts conform to the standards set out above, as well as the
Supreme Court’s decision in Gill v. Whitford.214 In fact, Georgia and
every other state will have to enact such a map with the 2020 census
approaching.215 In the interim, however, the more pertinent issues a
new plan must address are the seventeen districts affected by House
Bill 566 and Districts 105 and 111 in particular.216
The first step in rectifying Georgia’s district lines is to have a more
inclusive drafting process. Conducting secret drafting meetings and
omitting entire political parties from those meetings will likely result
in maps drawn that heavily disfavor the excluded party and will also
add to the appearance of discriminatory intent if the map is
challenged.217 If Democratic representatives—the party excluded
from drafting meetings for House Bill 566218—are included in the
drafting process, the resulting map may not give each party equal
representational power, but it will yield districts that lean more
toward political fairness compared to one created wholly by
Republicans.219 Similarly, more political fairness will likely result if
all Georgia residents are also allowed to publicly comment on the
proposed plan prior to its enactment and if those comments are
seriously considered rather than ignored.220 If political fairness
concerns are addressed and resolved before a plan leaves the drafting
room, public outrage, like what followed the proposed redistricting
plan in 2017, would be eliminated.221
214. Brief of Amici Curiae Judicial Watch, supra note 122, at *17–18.
215. Parsons, supra note 208, at 176.
216. H.B. 566, 153rd Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2015).
217. Ga. State Conference of the NAACP v. Georgia, 269 F. Supp. 3d 1266, 1271 (N.D. Ga. filed
Aug. 25, 2017); Whitford, 218 F. Supp. 3d 894.
218. NAACP, 269 F. Supp. 3d at 1271.
219. Cf. Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra note 14, at 865. While discussing the problem faced in
apportioning voter share in uncontested races, Stephanopoulos and McGhee point at the only certainties
in that scenario is that those races’ “outcome[s] would have been different had [they] been contested.”
Id.
220. Cf. NAACP, 269 F. Supp. 3d at 1271. “[M]inority residents of Georgia were denied any
opportunity for public comment on the measure” that is the subject of the suit. Id.
221. See, e.g., Aaron Gould Sheinin, Democrats Cry Foul as House Republicans Redraw District
Lines, ATLANTA J.-CONST. (Mar. 3, 2017, 6:49 PM), http://www.myajc.com/news/state—regionalgovt—politics/democrats-cry-foul-house-republicans-redraw-districtlines/sOOXVi3vMCWJCB7gpAntTN/ [https://perma.cc/3JGX-C5WR]; Torpy, supra note 18.
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Legislative mapmakers also need to work alongside statistical
experts during the drafting process. Together, they will create many
different district maps that compose a spectrum of partisanship
ranging from ones heavily in favor of Republicans to those that
greatly advantage Democrats.222 As part of developing this
partisanship range, legislators must vary each map’s EG, shape,
compactness, divisions of political neighborhoods, and other
“traditional” factors.223
On the other hand, Georgia should not set the EG’s
constitutionality threshold at the eight percent limit suggested by
Stephanopoulos and McGhee.224 Rather, Georgia legislators must use
their discretion in adopting a precise threshold mainly due to the
state’s history of single-party dominance and profound political
geography that favors one party over the other.225 For example, in the
1970s and 1980s, the EGs of Georgia’s state house plans were the
most pro-Democratic not just of any state in the south, which was
predominately inclined toward Democrats, but of any state in the
nation.226 During this period, Georgia’s EGs consistently exceeded
the eight percent threshold, landing instead in the fourteen to sixteen
percent range.227 Since 1980, each successive Georgia plan has
reflected a stronger Republican preference, eventually shifting to a
Republican EG greater than six percent in 2012.228 Averaging some
of the highest EGs on both ends of the spectrum, Georgia’s threshold
ought to be raised to ten percent to account for the state’s trend in
extreme political favoritism. This specific threshold number is, of
course, merely a suggestion. Georgia’s legislature is free to follow

222. See Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra note 14, at 889–90.
223. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 347–50 (2004) (Souter, J., dissenting).
224. Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra note 14, at 888.
225. See id. at 879–84.
226. See id. at 882–84. Georgia’s state house plans in the 1970s were some of the most proDemocratic EGs, second only to South Carolina, and, throughout the 1980s, they exhibited the most
pro-Democratic EGs of any state. Id.
227. See id. at 883–84, 889.
228. Id. at 882–83 (showing that each successive decennial districting plan since the 1980s has
trended towards higher Republican EGs). See supra TABLE 5 (showing the EG under the 2012 plan to be
6.345%).
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any limit it wishes, so long as it is reasonable and does not conflict
with any threshold imposed by the Supreme Court.229
Mapmakers must also avoid creating districts that are facially
susceptible to unconstitutional gerrymandering claims. Unlike the
revised District 111 under House Bill 566—the district most facially
gerrymandered—districts devised under this revamped drafting
process should maintain boundaries that are not highly unusual in
shape and should not cut across political neighborhoods and towns.230
A good example of this are the districts created in and around
Atlanta. In counties like Fulton, DeKalb, Henry, and Clayton,
residents predominately vote for Democrats.231 Accordingly, house
lines must largely stick to pre-established borders and avoid mixing
Democratic metro areas with more Republican suburbs232 to decrease
the likelihood of packing and cracking. Although this method is
similar to the one used in drafting Wisconsin’s Act 43, the difference
is that both parties will participate in drafting so that, unlike Act 43,
the map ultimately enacted will be more politically competitive and
give a significantly smaller partisan advantage to one party.233
Conforming to drafting guidelines like these promotes political
transparency and fairness that does not necessitate one political party
completely ceding to the other, but instead gives Georgia legislators
“a comprehensible field map to stay out of court.”234 A renewed
drafting process will also eliminate legislators’ focus on creating
districts that secure their re-elections, thus allowing their concerns to
shift to issues of preserving communities that actually share political
interests, as well as achieving districts that best maximize
229. See Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra note 14, at 890–91.
230. See also Whitford v. Gill, 218 F. Supp. 3d 837, 888, 912 (W.D. Wis. 2016) , vacated, 138 S. Ct.
1916 (2018). For a better visual of the unusual and salamander-like shape of District 111, see District
111, supra note 186.
231. 2016 Georgia Presidential Election Results, supra note 189.
232. See General Election 2016, supra note 112; General Election 2014, supra note 161; General
Election 2012, supra note 161. Election data show that democratic candidates in districts surrounding
metro-Atlanta historically run unopposed and that republican candidates in suburbs like Alpharetta are
similarly uncontested. General Election 2016, supra note 112; General Election 2014, supra note 161;
General Election 2012, supra note 161.
233. Whitford, 218 F. Supp. 3d at 911–12.
234. Parsons, supra note 208, at 177.

Published by Reading Room,

39

Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 35, Iss. 2 [], Art. 7

526

GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 35:2

communities’ political influence.235 The Georgia legislature should
adopt internal procedures like the ones suggested here that ensure
substantial partisan advantage is not a factor in district mapmaking.
CONCLUSION
Excessive partisan gerrymandering is increasingly more prominent
in state redistricting plans. Legislators have abused their majority
control of state governments to the point where citizens’
constitutional voting rights are infringed and severely handicapped
by plans that discriminate against voters because of political
affiliations.236 Though a certain level of partisan gerrymandering is
tolerable and unavoidable, the extent to which it is involved in
current political processes ignores basic constitutional rights.237 After
decades of the Supreme Court rejecting unconstitutional
gerrymandering claims, a justiciable standard has emerged with the
Efficiency Gap.238 This half-political, half-statistical measure works
in conjunction with a three-step standard: evidence of a plan’s
discriminatory intent, effect, and lack of justification.239 The result is
a legal test that determines when a plan is unconstitutional and also
addresses the Supreme Court’s concerns with past tests.240
Applying this test, Georgia’s 2015 redistricting plan is likely
unconstitutional. This results from the Republican-controlled
legislature’s intent to weaken Democratic voting powers and an
Efficiency Gap so high it nearly doubles the threshold proposed by
the measure’s creators. Additionally, unusual districts that splice
political communities and a lack of legitimate legislative justification
in designing these districts also contribute to the plan’s
unconstitutionality. However, Georgia can take steps to prevent this
235. Id.
236. See Ga. State Conference of the NAACP v. Georgia, 269 F. Supp. 3d 1266, 1271 (N.D. Ga. filed
Aug. 25, 2017); Whitford, 218 F. Supp. 3d at 898–99.
237. Parsons, supra note 208, at 176.
238. See, e.g., League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 399 (2006); Vieth v.
Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 287–88, 293 (2004); Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 116 (1986).
239. Whitford, 218 F. Supp. 3d at 884.
240. Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra note 14, at 848–49.
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unconstitutionality by enacting a remedial plan that conforms to this
new legal standard and by being more inclusive and transparent in
future redistricting decisions.
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